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Non-Technical Summary 
 
In March 2007, the European Council has agreed upon an ambitious climate policy for the European 
Union. Given the present lack of an international agreement for the Post-Kyoto era, the EU has com-
mitted to an unilateral emission reduction target of 20% of greenhouse gases in 2020 vis-à-vis 1990 
levels. However, such an unilateral abatement policy potentially endangers European competitiveness, 
while the relocation of energy-intensive industries outside Europe may substantially reduce its envi-
ronmental effectiveness (the so-called ‘carbon leakage’ problem). To mitigate both detrimental effects, 
two remedies are currently under consideration in the EU policy arena: border tax adjustments (BTA) 
and integrated emission trading (IET). Border tax adjustments consist first of tariffs on imported goods 
mimicking an (environmental) tax on domestic goods and second of rebates for the domestic tax on 
exported goods. In contrast, under an integrated emission trading regime, foreign producers purchase 
emission certificates for imports into the EU, while domestic producers do not pay a duty on exports. 
This paper analyses both policy regimes within a theoretical and a numerical framework. In a stylized 
two-country model, we demonstrate that both policy options are suitable to address the negative com-
petitiveness implications for domestic producers and to minimise the leakage problem. However, BTA 
is more effective in protecting domestic competitiveness, while IET reduces foreign emissions to a 
larger extent. Applying a multi-region, multi-sector general equilibrium model we analyse economic 
and environmental implications of an unilateral 20% reduction target for the EU including the offset-
ting policies. The results from our theoretical framework are confirmed for the energy-intensive sec-
tors (covered by either BTA or IET), while the effect of the policy regimes on non-energy intensive 
sectors (not covered by BTA or IET) significantly modifies the results at the aggregate level: For the 
domestic energy-intensive and export-oriented sectors the choice between the BTA and IET regimes 
for the European Union is a matter of priority for protecting their competitiveness or inducing respec-
tive foreign energy-intensive sectors to reduce carbon emissions. In contrast, BTA has rather pro-
nounced negative implications for the production level of the sectors not covered by the offsetting 
measures. This result is due to an emission abatement shifting – given the emission reduction target – 
from covered energy-intensive industries with relatively low abatement costs to non-energy-intensive 
sectors with relatively high abatement costs under the BTA regime. The same phenomenon can be 
observed for the IET policy, albeit to a lesser extend. On the aggregate level this leads to a negative 
impact of both policies on domestic production in comparison to the unilateral abatement policy. Im-
portantly, countries introducing BTA and IET for the energy-intensive sectors only end up with higher 
emission allowance prices compared to the unilateral abatement policy without any complementary 
measures. Finally, the global environmental effectiveness of the BTA and IET on foreign emissions is 
quite similar. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Im März 2007 hat der Europäische Rat die Europäische Union (EU) zu einer ambitionierten Klimapo-
litik verpflichtet. Insbesondere hat er der EU ein Reduktionsziel bei Treibhausgas-Emissionen von 
20% bis 2020 gegenüber 1990 für den Fall gesetzt, dass kein internationales Klimaschutzabkommen 
für die Zeit nach dem Kioto-Protokoll zustande kommen sollte. Solch eine unilaterale Klimapolitik 
könnte jedoch die europäische Wettbewerbsfähigkeit gefährden und ihre Umweltwirksamkeit durch 
die Verlagerung energieintensiver Industrien ins außereuropäische Ausland unterminieren. Um diese 
negativen Effekte zu mildern, werden in der politischen Debatte in der EU derzeit zwei mögliche Po-
litikmaßnahmen diskutiert: Umweltzölle (engl. ”border tax adjustments”, BTA) und integrierter Emis-
sionshandel (engl. ”integrated emission trading”, IET). BTA bestehen aus einer Abgabe auf impor-
tierte Güter, die der heimischen Umweltsteuer entsprechen, sowie einer Kompensation für die Um-
weltabgabe auf exportierte Güter. Im Gegensatz dazu müssen Importeure unter einer IET-Regulierung 
Emissionszertifikate im heimischen Zertifikatemarkt erwerben (entsprechend der mit den Importgütern 
verbundenen Emissionen), während Exporteure keine Umweltabgabe zu entrichten haben. Dieses Dis-
kussionspapier analysiert und vergleicht beide Politikmaßnahmen in einem theoretischen und numeri-
schen Modellrahmen. Der theoretische Modellrahmen ist ein stilisiertes Zwei-Länder-Modell, in dem 
die Produktions- und die Energieintensitätsentscheidung der inländischen und ausländischen Produ-
zenten abgebildet werden. Wir zeigen, dass die Politiken sowohl das Problem der Wettbewerbsfähig-
keit als auch der Emissionsverlagerung mildern. Dabei ist BTA beim Schutz der heimischen Produk-
tion effektiver, wahrend IET zu einer stärkeren Reduktion ausländischer Emissionen führt. In einem 
multi-regionalen und multi-sektoralen allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodell werden ökonomische und 
umweltpolitische Implikationen eines unilateralen Emissionsreduktionsziels für die EU von 20% un-
tersucht. Die numerische Analyse bestätigt die theoretische Einsicht für die energieintensiven Sektoren 
(die dem BTA- und IET- Regime unterliegen), wohingegen der Effekt der Politiken auf die nicht ener-
gieintensiven Sektoren (die an BTA und IET nicht teilnehmen) zu einer erheblichen Veränderung der 
Resultate auf der aggregierten Ebene führt: Für die EU ist die Wahl zwischen BTA und IET eine Frage 
der Priorität von Schutz der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit energieintensiver und exportorientierter EU In-
dustrien bzw. Induzierung von Emissionsreduktion in den ausländischen energieintensiven Sektoren. 
Im Gegensatz dazu hat BTA einen deutlich negativen Effekt auf das Produktionsniveau der nichtener-
gieintensiven Sektoren. Dieses Resultat kommt – bei gegebenem Gesamtreduktionsziel – durch eine 
Verlagerung der Emissionsreduktion von den energieintensiven Sektoren (mit vergleichsweise niedri-
gen Reduktionskosten) zu nicht-energieintensiven Sektoren (mit vergleichsweise hohen Reduktions-
kosten) zustande. Das gleiche Phänomen tritt im Falle der IET-Politik auf, allerdings in geringerem 
Maße. Auf dem aggregierten Niveau führt dies zu negativen Auswirkungen beider Politiken auf die 
heimische Produktion im Vergleich zur unilateralen Klimapolitik. Unsere Modellergebnisse zeigen 
außerdem, dass Länder, die BTA und IET einführen, höhere Zertifikatepreise erhalten als im Falle der 
unilateralen Politik. Schließlich zeigt die numerische Analyse, dass die globale Effektivität von BTA 
und IET in Bezug auf ausländische Emissionen sehr ähnlich ist. 
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Abstract
In the absence of an international agreement on climate policy, unilateral
carbon abatement creates two problems: It tends to have a detrimental effect
on domestic competitiveness, and it leads to an increase in carbon emissions
abroad (leakage). This paper analyses two policies that have recently been
proposed to mitigate these problems: Border tax adjustments (BTA) and in-
tegrated emission trading (IET). The former policy levies a quantity-based,
the latter an emission based duty on imports from non-abating countries. In
a stylised two-country model we demonstrate that the policies address both
problems. However, BTA protects domestic competitiveness more effectively,
while IET achieves a greater reduction in foreign emissions. A computational
general equilibrium analysis of the unilateral abatement policy adopted by the
European Union confirms our theoretical insights for the sectors covered by the
offsetting measures. However, the implications for the competitiveness of non-
covered sectors are negative. These two effects constitute the central trade-off
in the implementation of both policies.
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1 Introduction
At the Spring Summit in March 2007, the European Council agreed upon an
ambitious plan for the post-Kyoto era. It envisages reducing greenhouse gas
emissions in the EU by at least 20% compared to 1990 levels by 2020, and by
30% if other industrialised countries undertake similar efforts (EU, 2007). For
the time being, however, international disagreement over future climate policy
persists. With the adoption of the Bali Action Plan in December 2007, the
thirteenth United Nations Climate Change Conference outlined schedule and
structure for follow-up negotiations towards a post-2012 framework. But given
deep divergences among industrialised and developing countries on new binding
reduction commitments, an international agreement upon ambitious abatement
targets for all parties remains rather uncertain in the medium term.
Evidently, unilateral environmental policies cause concern about compet-
itiveness implications, particularly for those sectors that are energy-intensive
and export-oriented. Companies from EU member states facing high prices
for emission certificates may find it difficult to compete against foreign compa-
nies unconstrained by such environmental regulation. Hence, unilateral actions
envisaged by the European Union may lead to the relocation of European in-
stallations to countries with less strict emission regulation. This phenomenon
- known as ”carbon leakage” - could undermine European efforts to combat
climate change and damage international competitiveness of European energy-
intensive industries. Trade policy measures as a remedy are on the top of the
European political agenda and have found support by many EU stakeholders.
As a prominent example, a resolution of the European Parliament has recently
called on the Commission to consider border tax adjustments (BTA) for third
countries which are not bound by the Kyoto Protocol (European Parliament,
2007). An alternative remedy - the integration of importers into the European
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) - is being considered by the European
Commission. In a speech in London on January 21st 2008, the President of
the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, said: ”[...] I think we should
also be ready to [...] require importers to obtain allowances alongside European
competitors, as long as such a system is compatible with WTO requirements...”.
Referring to this political debate, this paper compares these two alterna-
tive policy regimes that are to mitigate competitiveness and carbon leakage
problems in unilateral climate policy: border tax adjustments (BTA) and inte-
grated emission trading (IET). We thus extend the existing literature by adding
the concept of IET. Border tax adjustments consist first of tariffs on imported
goods mimicking an (environmental) tax on domestic goods and second of re-
bates for the domestic tax on exported goods. In contrast, under an integrated
emission trading regime, foreign producers purchase emission certificates for
their imports according to the emissions produced. Correspondingly, domestic
producers do not participate in the emission trading scheme. In other words,
the former regime levies a quantity-based, the latter an emission based duty
on imports from non-abating countries and compensates domestic exporters
accordingly. Given the GATT treaty on free trade and the absence of official
carbon registers in some countries both BTA and IET raise legal and practical
questions concerning their implementation. While these questions are not the
focus of this article, we will discuss them in the conclusions.
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Early contributions on border tax adjustments show that they guarantee
trade neutrality in a world with differentiated taxation under the origin and
the destination principle (Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1973, Meade 1974, Gross-
man 1980). Barthold (1994) and Poterba and Rotemberg (1995) introduce
BTA into the field of environmental economics. Babiker and Rutherford (2005)
quantify allocative effects of BTA for abating and non-abating countries in the
context of climate policy under the Kyoto protocol. Ismer and Neuhoff (2004),
Demailly and Quirion (2006) and Peterson and Schleich (2007) analyse BTA
as a complementary policy measure of the European Emission Trading System
(EU ETS). Based on a partial equilibrium model, Ismer and Neuhoff (2004)
demonstrate that BTA can mitigate the productive and allocative inefficien-
cies of an emission trading scheme. One main caveat in their formal setup is,
however, that the energy efficiency decision of firms is not modelled explicitly.
Using a computational general equilibrium model, Peterson and Schleich (2007)
emphasise the importance of alternative benchmarks for the BTA level and cor-
responding economic implications. Demailly and Quirion (2006), who focus
on the cement sector and use a numerical partial equilibrium framework, find
that BTA can be an efficient remedy for the leakage problem. Mathiesen and
Maestad (2004) show a similar result for the Norvegian steel industry under
the Kyoto protocol. This paper contributes to the existing literature by in-
troducing the concept of IET and comparing the economic and environmental
implications of both instruments.
We apply a theoretical and a computational framework. In a stylised two-
country model capturing basic features of emissions and international trade
we show that both policies address both the competitiveness and the leakage
problem. The main result in the theoretical part is that the BTA regime is
more effective in mitigating the negative competitiveness effects of unilateral
climate policy on the domestic sector, while the IET scheme achieves a greater
reduction in foreign emissions in the respective sectors.
These results are confirmed for energy-intensive sectors (which participate
in the emission trading scheme and thus in a BTA or IET policy) by a multi-
region multi-sectoral computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis, in which
we adopt a unilateral abatement policy that reduces effective emissions in the
European Union by 20% until 2020. The multi-sectoral numerical approach
provides further insights into economic and environmental implications of the
offsetting measures, as it takes into consideration the fact that only energy-
intensive sectors are covered by an emission trading scheme. Countries intro-
ducing BTA and IET for energy-intensive sectors end up with higher emission
allowance prices compared to the unilateral abatement policy without any com-
plementary measures. This is due to the emissions abatement shifting from
covered energy-intensive industries with relatively low abatement costs to non-
energy-intensive sectors with relatively high abatement costs. This shifting is
particularly pronounced under the BTA regime with a strong negative impact
on the production level of the non-energy intensive sectors. It can lead to a
reversion of the aggregate effect of BTA on the production level. Finally, the
implication of BTA and IET for global emission levels are quite similar.
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the setup of the two-
country model and analyses the equilibrium outcomes for three stylised policy
options, i.e. unilateral abatement policy, BTA and IET. Section 3 provides a
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description of the computable equilibrium model, introduces policy scenarios
and presents main numerical results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical Analysis: A Two-Country-Model
In this section, we introduce a simple two-country model to study economic and
environmental implications of unilateral abatement policy with and without
complementary measures, i.e. border tax adjustments and integrated emission
trading. The model builds on the partial equilibrium analysis in Bo¨hringer and
Lange (2005a) (see also Bo¨hringer and Lange 2005b) that discusses different
abatement policies in a closed economy context. In our framework we abstract
from possible impacts of climate policy on government revenues, labour supply
and welfare and focus on output, energy intensity and carbon emissions in-
stead. The model provides basic insights for the numerical simulation analysis
in section 3.
2.1 Formal Setup
The model encompasses two countries (commonly denoted by r), the domestic
country d and the foreign country f . The representative household in each coun-
try disposes of initial wealth wr, r ∈ {d, f}. It derives utility from consumption
only. In order to establish consistency with the numerical framework, we adopt
the Armington assumption (Armington 1969) of product heterogeneity in in-
ternational trade: The standard goods produced in d and in f are imperfect
substitutes in household preferences. Prices for these goods prprc form on com-
petitive markets, including imports and exports. The representative firm in r
chooses the quantity of the good produced for the domestic market qrd, for the
foreign market qrf and energy intensity of production µ
r. Quantities and energy
intensity determine emissions E = µr(qrf + q
r
d) in country r.
Costs of production C(µ, q) = c(µ)q are constant returns to scale with re-
spect to quantity and decreasing and concave in energy intensity, i.e. c′(µ) <
0, c′′(µ) > 0. By cr we denote the marginal cost function in region r, its deriva-
tive is expressed by cr1.
The government of the domestic country lauches emission trading with full
auctioning to achieve a certain emission target E¯ for its country. In our simple
deterministic setup such an emission trading system is equivalent to a carbon
tax τ . Furthermore, the domestic government can impose a tariff κ on imported
goods and pay a tax rebate for exported goods (border tax adjustment), or it
can sell off emission allowances abroad (integrated emission trading).
To keep the model tractable, the household disposes of a fixed income (no
labour supply decision) and thus maximises its utility in consumption only.
We denote Marshallian demand by the household in country rc for the good
produced in rp by
qrprc = d
rp
rc (p
d
rc , p
f
rc , wrc). (1)
Utility maximisation with Cobb-Doublas utility functions
urc(q
d
rc , q
f
rc) = k(q
d
rc)
αrc (qfrc)
1−αrc
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yields the following demand functions:
qdd =
αdwd
pdd
qfd =
(1− αd)wd
pfd
,
qdf =
αfwf
pdf
qff =
(1− αf )wf
pff
.
As the demand functions are separable, a price increase for one good has no
effect on the absolute demand for the other good. This is a special feature of
CD preferences, which is not present in a CES framework. Thus we abstract
from income effects of taxation and concentrate on substitution effects instead.
Finally we assume that 0 < αd < 1, 0 < αf < 11.
We will now formally state the problem of the representative firm in the
domestic and in the foreign country: The firm maximises profits by choosing
energy intensity and quantities produced, taking prices for its products as given.
As a first benchmark for a later comparison of policies we formulate the problem
of the firm in the absence of carbon abatement policy (”laissez-faire”, LF).
The profit function of the domestic firm is
Πd = pddq
d
d + p
f
dq
d
f − cd(µd)(qdd + qdf ),
and the one of the foreign firms is
Πf = pfdq
f
d + p
f
fq
f
f − cf (µf )(qfd + qff ).
Profit maximisation leads to the first order conditions of the firm (with
r ∈ {d, f})
pdd − cd(µd) = 0, (2)
pdf − cd(µd) = 0, (3)
cd1(µ
d) = 0. (4)
The first two conditions say that prices are -both for domestic and foreign
goods- equal to their marginal costs of production. The last condition states
that energy intensity is increased to the point that its marginal costs are zero.
We conclude that pdd = p
d
f =: p
d as well as pfd = p
f
f =: p
f . The production
of goods in the domestic country results in emissions
ELF = µd(qdf + q
d
d).
To make our problem interesting, in the following we assume
Assumption 1 (Emission Cap) The emission cap E¯ imposed by the domes-
tic government is lower than ELF , i.e. 0 < E¯ < ELF .
1Otherwise demand for one of the goods breaks down and an analysis of demand effects of the
policies becomes senseless.
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One important feature of our specification of the production technology
is the following: Although the standard good is produced for two different
markets (home and abroad), the choice of energy efficiency is the same for
both quantities. The implicit assumption, that industries do not build separate
production lines for different markets, is standard.
The following subsection discusses the problem of the firm under the different
policy regimes.
2.2 Abatement Policies
Unilateral Abatement Policy We use unilateral abatement policy (UAP)
as a second benchmark in our comparison of domestic carbon policies that ad-
dress the problems of competitiveness and leakage in an international context.
The government of the domestic country auctions emission allowances to ensure
that total emissions of domestic production do not exceed E¯. This corresponds
to the governement setting a carbon tax τ (where τ is equivalent to the price of
the allowance). We state the profit functions and first order conditions of both
firms under UAP2.
Under UAP, the profit function of the domestic firm is given by
Πd = pddq
d
d + p
f
dq
d
f − cd(µd)(qdd + qdf )− τµd(qdd + qdf ).
From this, the associated first order conditions can be derived:
pdd − cd(µd)− τµd = 0 (5)
pdf − cd(µd)− τµd = 0 (6)
cd1(µ
d) + τ = 0 (7)
Again we conclude that pdd = p
d
f =: p
d.
The profit function of the foreign firm is
Πf = pfdq
f
d + p
f
fq
f
f − cf (µf )(qfd + qff ),
and consequently we derive the first order conditions
pfd − cf (µf ) = 0 (8)
pff − cf (µf ) = 0 (9)
cf1 (µ
f ) = 0 (10)
As above pfd = p
f
f =: p
f . The first order conditions of the foreign firm
remain unchanged in comparison to the laissez-faire case.
The government sets τ so that in equilibrium emission remain below the cap
E¯ ≥ µd(qdd + qdf ). (11)
2All variables used in this and the next section should have indices indicating the policy case, as
they take different values across the three scenarios. For ease of exposition, this additional index
has been dropped here, but will be set in the next section.
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Border Tax Adjustment In the second policy scenario the government
uses border tax adjustments (BTA) to offset differences in taxation for imported
and exported goods. A quantity-based tariff κ is levied on the imported good. It
is set to match the tax on the ”average” carbon content of the good. With BTA,
the carbon content of the import good is measured as if it had been produced
domestically3. Characteristicly for a tariff, we do not need information about
foreign emissions.
Formally stated:
κ = τµd. (12)
Exporters receive a tax refund of κ per quantitiy sold which matches their
emission in production. The formal setup is as follows:
The profit function of the domestic firm is
Πd = pddq
d
d + p
f
dq
d
f − cd(µd)(qdd + qdf )− τµd(qdd + qdf ) + κqdf
First order conditions (domestic firm):
pdd − cd(µd)− τµd = 0 (13)
pdf − cd(µd)− τµd + κ = 0 (14)
cd1(µ
d) + τ = 0 (15)
Condition 13 states that the price for the domestic good is equal to its
marginal cost plus the tax on emissions times energy intensity (which amounts
to a tax on quantities produced). Condition 14 states that the price for the
export good is marginal costs plus tax on emissions minus the rebate. Condition
15 says that the marginal costs of energy intensity are equal to minus the tax
on emissions.
The profit function of the foreign firm is given by
Πf = pfdq
f
d + p
f
fq
f
f − cf (µf )(qfd + qff )− κqfd
First order conditions (foreign firm):
pfd − cf (µf )− κ = 0 (16)
pff − cf (µf ) = 0 (17)
cf1 (µ
f ) = 0 (18)
Condition 16 says that the price for the import good is equal to its marginal
costs plus the environmental tariff. According to condition 17, the price for the
foreign good at home is equal to its marginal cost, as in the LF and UAP case.
Similarly, condition 18 states that the marginal cost of energy intensity is zero
in equilibrium.
3In fact, the measurement of emissions as related to imports is critical for the implementation of
BTA, both from a legal and a practical viewpoint. For a discussion of this issue we refer to section
4.
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As before the government sets τ so that the emission cap is achieved:
E¯ ≥ µd(qdd + qdf ). (19)
Note that κ applies to quantities of goods, not emissions. This is the sys-
tematic difference with respect to the third policy scenario.
Integrated emission trading In the third policy scenario the government
designs an integrated emission trading (IET) scheme: Foreign producers have
to purchase emission certificates for their imports into the domestic country at
a price τ . In contrast to an emission trading with BTA it is emissions that are
targeted by the IET, not quantities. Goods exported to the foreign country are
exempt from the environmental duty.
Formally, the model is as follows
Profit function of the domestic firm
Πd = pddq
d
d + p
f
dq
d
f − cd(µd)(qdd + qdf )− τµdqdd
First order conditions (domestic firm)
pdd − cd(µd)− τµd = 0 (20)
pdf − cd(µd) = 0 (21)
cd1(µ
d)(qdd + q
d
f ) + τq
d
d = 0 (22)
Condition 20 states that the price of the domestic good is equal to its
marginal cost plus the tax on quantities - it is identical to the BTA case. Con-
dition 21, in contrast, says that the price for exports is equal to marginal cost,
as in the LF case. Other than in the BTA case, the firm internalises the effect
of the energy intensity decision on the carbon price. Condition 22 says that the
marginal cost of energy intensity is equal to the tax times the fraction of the
domestic good over total domestic output.
The profit function of the foreign firm is given by
Πf = pfdq
f
d + p
f
fq
f
f − cf (µf )(qfd + qff )− τµfqfd
Note the difference with the profit function under BTA: Under IET, the
actual emissions of the foreign firm are taxed, and thus its energy intensity is
the basis for the duty.
First order conditions (foreign firm)
pfd − cf (µf )− τµf = 0 (23)
pff − cf (µf ) = 0 (24)
cf1 (µ
f )(qfd + q
f
f ) + τq
f
d = 0 (25)
Condition 23 states the price for the export good is equal to marginal costs
times the emission tax (on quantities), mimicking condition 20 for the domestic
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firm. Condition 24 says that the price of the foreign good is equal to its marginal
costs. As in the case of the domestic firm, condition 25 says that the marginal
cost of energy intensity is equal to the tax times the fraction of exports over
total foreign output.
Note that we have chosen to keep the same emission cap across all three pol-
icy scenarios. Thus the domestic government sets a cap on domestic emissions,
i.e. emissions caused by domestic production
E¯ ≥ µd(qdd + qdf ). (26)
However, taxes τ can vary accross scenarios.
Quite importantly, in the integrated emission trading scheme presented in
our analysis the importers do not participate in the domestic market for emis-
sion allowances directly. Their allowances are ”set aside”, i.e. the domestic
government issues additional allowances at the domestic carbon price. A logical
extension of IET would be a cap on emissions caused by domestic consumption:
Both domestic producers and importers would have to compete for emission al-
lowances to sell their products in the domestic market. This would change the
trade paradigm, abandoning the origin in favour of the destination principle.
Consumption, not production, would be the basis for a carbon tax. However,
as foreign emissions remain unregulated under BTA and UAP, such an altered
version of IET can not be compared directly to the other two policies and is
therefore not considered here. This feature holds also true in our numerical
analysis.
2.3 Equilibrium conditions
In this section we derive equilibrium conditions and prove the existence of an
equilibrium.
Utility maximisation by households yields demand functions that specify
quantities as function of prices. Profit maximisation by firms yields first order
conditions that determine prices as function of all other variables. The gov-
ernment sets taxes and tariffs to enforce its rules, in particular, the emission
cap.
Formally, equilibrium conditions take the following form:
1. Zero-Profit (FOCs of the firms)
prprc = P (q
rp
d , q
rp
f , µ
rp , τ, κ)
µrp =M(qrpd , q
rp
f , τ, κ)
2. Utility maximisation (FOCs of the households)
qrprc = d
rp
rc (p
d
rc , p
f
rc , wrc)
3. Emission cap
E¯ ≥ E(qdd , qdf , qfd , qff , µrp)
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The functional form of the conditions has been derived in the previous sub-
section. In order to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium we impose the
standard assumption on the marginal cost functions cd(.) and cf (.) to avoid
corner solutions.
Assumption 2 (Inada condition) The marginal cost functions cr(.) satisfy
lim
µ→0
cr1(µ)→ −∞.
Moreover, there exist unique µˆd and µˆf such that
cd1(µˆ
d) = cf1 (µˆ
f ) = 0.
From this assumption we derive
Proposition 1 Under assumptions 1 and 2 unique equilibria exist in all three
scenarios.
Proof. See appendix.
2.4 Policy Outcomes
In this section, we use the model of the preceding section to analyse economic
and environmental impacts of alternative policy options in climate policy. We
address both competitiveness and leakage, i.e. we focus on production levels
and energy intensities.
Our first proposition compares the three policies with the laissez-faire sce-
nario. They show how domestic economic activity is slowed down by emission
reduction.
Proposition 2 (Laissez Faire vs. Abatement Policies) A comparison of
the laissez-faire and the unilateral abatement policy yields
(µd)LF > (µd)UAP (µf )LF = (µf )UAP
(pd)LF < (pd)UAP (pf )LF = (pf )UAP
(qdd + q
d
f )
LF > (qdd + q
d
f )
UAP (qfd + q
f
f )
LF = (qfd + q
f
f )
UAP
A comparison of the laissez-faire and a border tax adjustment policy yields
(µd)LF > (µd)BTA (µf )LF = (µf )BTA
(pdd)
LF < (pdd)
BTA (pfd)
LF < (pfd)
BTA
(pdf )
LF < (pdf )
BTA (pff )
LF = (pff )
BTA
(qdd + q
d
f )
LF > (qdd + q
d
f )
BTA (qdd + q
d
f )
LF > (qdd + q
d
f )
BTA
9
A comparison of the laissez-faire and a global emission trading system yields
(µd)LF > (µd)IET (µf )LF > (µf )IET
(pdd)
LF < (pdd)
IET (pfd)
LF < (pfd)
IET
(pdf )
LF < (pdf )
IET (pff )
LF < (pff )
IET
(qdd + q
d
f )
LF > (qdd + q
d
f )
IET (qdd + q
d
f )
LF > (qdd + q
d
f )
IET
Proof. See appendix
First, whereas unilateral abatement policy only reduces the economic per-
formance of the domestic country4, border tax adjustment and integrated emis-
sion trading have consequences for the foreign country as well. The taxation
of emissions leads both to an increase in energy efficiency and to an increase
in consumer prices for domestic goods and thus to a reduction in demand for
them, both in the domestic and in the foreign market. Both border tax adjust-
ment and integrated emission trading amount to levying an environmental tariff
on imports, thus increasing the price for the imported good. The former is a
indirect carbon duty, the latter a direct one, i.e. under a BTA policy, a tariff
is levied on imports independent of emissions caused by production, under IET
the foreign producer has an incentive to increase energy efficiency as he pays
for the emissions caused by his imports to the domestic market.
Energy Intensities The next step in the analysis of policy outcomes is the
comparison of equilibrium energy intensities. The equilibrium choice of energy
intensity is important for the understanding of the policy outcome in general.
Proposition 3 (Comparison of energy intensities) In equilibrium, energy
intensities in the domestic and the foreign country satisfy the following inequal-
ities
(µd)UAP > (µd)BTA (µf )UAP = (µf )BTA
(µd)UAP = (µd)IET (µf )UAP > (µf )IET
(µd)BTA < (µd)IET (µf )BTA > (µf )IET
Concerning the domestic country, proposition 3 states that energy intensity
is equal under UAP and IET, whereas, compared to them, BTA lowers it.
This is a somewhat surprising result. From proposition 2 we know that carbon
abatement leads to an increase in energy efficiency - this is part of the economic
answer to making emissions costly. While it is still aggregate domestic emissions
that are capped under both BTA and IET, the pressure exerted by the carbon
levy is now limited to the output produced for the domestic country because
4Remember, though, that our choice of Cobb-Douglas preferences excludes wealth effects from
the analysis.
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exports are exempt. This makes the energy efficiency/quantity reduction trade-
off more pronounced which explains why energy efficiency under BTA increases
vis-a-vis UAP. The same influence exists in the case of IET, however, it is
exactly offset by the lowered price pressure on the export good.
The results for the energy intensity of the foreign country are straightfor-
ward: Neither UAP nor BTA affect equilibrium energy intensity which remains
at its maximum laissez-faire level. In contrast under IET, by levying a duty on
the carbon content of the import good the domestic country exerts an abate-
ment influence on the foreign firm, inducing it to increase its energy efficiency.
Prices and Quantities The next proposition presents a comparison of
equilibrium prices and quantities under the three policies. While the comparison
of UAP on the one hand and BTA and IET on the other hand is straightforward,
comparing BTA and IET turns out to be somewhat difficult. This is due to
the fact that the duty levied on the import good depends on the domestic
production function in the case of BTA and on the foreign production function
in the case of IET. Thus, with some variables being directly comparable, a full
comparison requires an additional assumption on the two cost functions. We
assume that they are identical.
Assumption 3 (Cost Symmetry ) The marginal cost function is equal for
both countries cd(.) ≡ cf (.).
Subsequently, all inequalities that require assumption 3 are labelled by an
index s.
Proposition 4 (Comparison of prices and quantities) In equilibrium, quan-
tities and prices chosen under UAP and under BTA compare as follows
(pdd)
UAP < (pdd)
BTA (pff )
UAP = (pff )
BTA
(pdf )
UAP > (pdf )
BTA (pfd)
UAP < (pfd)
BTA
(qdd + q
d
f )
UAP < (qdd + q
d
f )
BTA (qfd + q
f
f )
UAP > (qfd + q
f
f )
BTA
Under UAP and IET, the comparison yields
(pdd)
UAP < (pdd)
IET (pff )
UAP < (pff )
IET
(pdf )
UAP > (pdf )
IET (pfd)
UAP < (pfd)
IET
(qdd + q
d
f )
UAP = (qdd + q
d
f )
IET (qfd + q
f
f )
UAP > (qfd + q
f
f )
IET
Under BTA and IET equilibrium prices and quantities compare as follows
(pdd)
BTA < (pdd)
IET (pff )
BTA < (pff )
IET
11
(pdf )
BTA > (pdf )
IET (pfd)
BTA <s (p
f
d)
IET
(qdd + q
d
f )
BTA > (qdd + q
d
f )
IET (qfd + q
f
f )
BTA >s (q
f
d + q
f
f )
IET
Proposition 4 states the central economic implications of the three policy
regimes in our theoretical framework.
In the following we explain the major insights. As for domestic production,
we see that, in comparison to UAP, both BTA and IET lead to an increase in
the (gross) price for the domestic good and to a decrease in the price for the
export good. Both effects are more pronounced under IET than under BTA.
The price decrease under both regimes for the export good follows directly from
the rebate. The price increase for the domestic good is a consequence of the
higher abatement effort in the domestic market under BTA and IET, which is
necessary to reach the emission target while exports are tax exempt. As foreign
companies can use the energy efficiency margin to adjust to the domestic climate
policy under IET, domestic markets are under greater pressure to adapt than
under BTA - hence the price effect.
The foreign market is not directly affected by UAP and BTA - the price for
the foreign good remains unaltered in comparison to LF. In contrast, the energy
efficiency effort induced by IET in the foreign country leads to more costly
production and thus a higher price. The price of the export good increases
under BTA and IET, a plausible result of the duties levied. Higher energy
efficiency under IET in the foreign country makes the effect more pronounced
for this policy as long as we assume symmetry of cost functions.
The output effects of the policies are driven by changes in prices. Domes-
tic production increases under BTA vis-a-vis UAP, showing that this policy
achieves the intended effect on domestic competitiveness. The proof shows that
an increase in exports under BTA offsets a decrease in the consumption of the
domestic good. The same two effects apply to the comparison of IET and UAP.
In this case, however, they offset each other: Domestic production is equal un-
der IET and UAP. Consequently, BTA is more effective in protecting domestic
competitiveness than IET.
Clearly, the foreign country produces more under UAP than it does un-
der BTA and IET, as its production is not affected by domestic regulation.
Production is higher under BTA than under IET (assuming symmetry of cost
functions), as imports are cheaper and the price of the foreign good remains
unchanged under BTA.
One word concerning assumption 3: It is a sufficient, not a necessary con-
dition. In fact a glance at the proof of proposition 4 shows that all assertions
hold as long as marginal costs of producion abroad are not much lower than at
home. A change in the results is conceivable only when the foreign country has
much cheaper abatement options than the domestic one.
Emissions Finally, we turn to the environmental implications. The results
we have derived so far answer this question, since foreign emissions depend
on quantities produced in the foreign country and on foreign energy intensity.
Recall that the emission cap imposed on domestic production is equal under
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the three policies. In contrast, as we see from Corollary 5, the policies have a
different impact on foreign emissions.
Corollary 5 (Comparison of foreign emissions) Emissions in the foreign
country relate to each other as follows
(Ef )UAP > (Ef )BTA (Ef )UAP > (Ef )IET
(Ef )BTA >s (Ef )IET
Corollary 5 shows that both BTA and IET lead to a reduction in foreign
emissions compared to the case of UAP. In the case of BTA, this is a mere quan-
tity effect: A decrease in imports to the domestic country leads to a decrease
in output. In the case of IET, higher energy efficiency adds up with reduced
sales abroad. As for the comparison of foreign emissions under BTA and IET,
we need assumption 3 to achieve an unambiguous result, which is that under a
IET policy in the domestic country, the induced abatement in the foreign coun-
try is larger. Symmetry of cost functions is only a sufficient condition: The
results hold as long as marginal costs of production are higher abroad. This is
plausible because under IET foreign producers increase their energy efficiency,
which under BTA they do not. Only if their costs of doing so are very small,
much smaller than in the domestic country, the (then) larger output under IET
could offset the effect of increased energy efficiency and foreign emissions would
be higher than under BTA. I
To sum up, both BTA and IET achieve the target of mitigating negative
competitiveness effects of unilateral climate policy and leakage. While BTA is
more effective in the former, IET tends to be more effective in the latter.
3 Numerical General Equilibrium Analysis
While our stylized theoretical framework provides basic insights into economic
and environmental implications of alternative domestic policy options, a nu-
merical analysis can take real-world complexities into consideration. In the po-
litical discourse, offsetting measures such as BTA and IET have been proposed
to protect selected industries (i.e. energy-intensive and export-oriented sectors)
only. For a comprehensive policy analysis we therefore apply a standard multi-
sector, multi-region CGE model of international energy use and global trade
to assess, spillover effects to and market interactions with remaining industries.
Importantly, such an analysis was not possible within our one-sector theoretical
framework.
Below, we start our numerical analysis with a non-technical summary of
model framework, introduce the policy scenarios and discuss our numerical
results contrasting them with our theoretical findings.
3.1 Modelling approach
Figure 1 provides a diagrammatic structure of the open-economy CGE model
used for comparative-static impact analysis of BTA and IET regimes. For
details and an algebraic formulation of the core model see Bo¨hringer and Lange
(2005a).
13
 A representative agent RAr in each region r is endowed with labour L¯r,
capital K¯r and fossil-fuel resources Q¯ff,r which may be used for fossil fuel pro-
duction. The representative agent maximises utility from consumption of a
composite good Cr which combines demands for energy and non-energy com-
modities at a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES). Production Yir of com-
modities i in region r is described by nested separable CES functions with the
price-dependent use of capital, labour, energy and material in production. Car-
bon emissions are linked to the emission-relevant use of fossil fuels, while carbon
abatement occurs by fuel switching or energy savings in production and final
consumption. The modelling of international trade is based on the Armington
approach of product heterogeneity, so that domestic and foreign goods of the
same variety are distinguished by their origin (Armington, 1969). All goods
used in the domestic market in intermediate and final demand correspond to
a CES composite Air that combines the domestically produced variety Yir and
imports Mir of the same variety from other regions. Domestic production Yir
either enters the formation of the Armington good Air or is exported (Xir)
to other regions to satisfy their import demand. Trade with other regions is
represented by a set of horizontal export demand and import supply functions
at exogenous world import and export prices. A balance of payment constraint,
which is warranted through flexible exchange rates, incorporates the benchmark
trade deficit or surplus.
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Table 1: Model dimensions
Production sectors Countries and Regions
Energy EU regions
COA Coal EU15 Old Member States
CRU Crude oil EU12 New Member States
GAS Natural gas
OIL Refined oil products (REI)
ELE Electricity (REI)
Energy-intensive sectors Non-EU countries and regions
ORE Ferrous metals (EII) OOE Rest of OECD
PPP Paper products and publishing (EII) RUS Former Soviet Union
NMM Mineral products nec (EII) SMA Rest of South and Middle America
NFM Metals nec (EII) CHN China (including Hongkong)
ATP Air transport (REI) SEA Rest of South and East Asia
CRP Chemicals, rubber and plastics (REI) OPC OPEC
XRW Rest of the World
Non-energy-intensive sectors
ROI Rest of industry (NEI)
CGD Savings good
The model is based on consistent accounts of national production and con-
sumption, trade and energy flows for 2001 as provided by the GTAP 6 database
(Dimaranan and McDougall, 2006). Forward calibration of the 2001 economies
to the target year 2020 is based on energy trends for EU Member States (EU,
2003) and on international energy projections for non-European economies (US
Department of Energy, 2005).
Table 1 summarises the regional and sectoral aggregation of the model. The
regional aggregation of the GTAP database includes nine regions that are cen-
tral in the climate policy debate on competitiveness and leakage. The member
states of the European Union are aggregated to two major regions, EU15 (old
member states) and EU12 (new member states). The sectoral aggregation in
the model has been chosen to distinguish energy-intensive sectors from the rest
of the economy. It captures key dimensions in the analysis of greenhouse gas
abatement, such as differences in carbon intensity and the degree of substi-
tutability across carbon-intensive goods. The primary and secondary energy
goods identified in the model are coal, natural gas, crude oil, refined oil prod-
ucts, and electricity. The remaining sectors are aggregated to a composite
industry that produces a non-energy-intensive macro good.
In order to assess economic and environmental implications of complemen-
tary measures (i.e. BTA and IET), the EU is assumed to impose a unilat-
eral emission cap and to apply offseting measures to (five) energy-intensive and
export-oriented sectors, i.e. ferrous metals (ORE), non-ferrous metals (NFM),
chemicals (CRP ), mineral industries (NMM) and paper products and publish-
ing (PPP ). Numerical modelling of both regimes is consistent with our theo-
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retical approach in section 2: Under BTA, both the duty levied on imports and
the rebate for the EU exports from the covered sectors are quantity-based, i.e.
the BTA level is determined by the EU average carbon content in the produc-
tion of the corresponding energy-intensive goods in the specific sector. Thus,
no information about energy intensities of foreign producers is necessary un-
der the BTA regime. Under the IET, the EU exporters and the EU importers
face the allowance price which is applied to the actual carbon content of the
respective energy-intensive industry. For importers into the EU, the price of
emission allowances is exogenous. The allowances are from a set-aside budget.
BTA and IET do not apply to energy-producing, remaining energy-intensive
and non-energy-intensive sectors. Partial sectoral coverage of the BTA and
IET regimes is the major characteristic distinguishing the numerical analysis
from the theoretical one. Below we refer to energy-intensive and export-oriented
industries under BTA and IET regimes in aggregate manner as EII sectors. To
account for relevant market interactions, we display results for both remaining
energy-intensive sectors (REI) and non-energy-intensive sectors (NEI).
3.2 Policy scenarios
We illustrate the economic and environmental implications of BTA and IET
regimes using three stylized policy scenarios for the year 2020. Across all sce-
narios, the unilateral emission reduction target of the EU-27 is set at 20%
versus business-as-usual (BAU) emissions levels in 2020. This is a realistic as-
sumption given emission reduction targets vs. 1990/2005 levels within the EU
Energy Package and the degree of flexibility regarding the access of EU ETS
firms to CDM projects. We further assume efficient implementation of the emis-
sion reduction target through unrestricted intra-EU emission trading between
energy-intensive and non-energy-intensive industries. Revenues from the auc-
tioned allowances are rebated as lump-sum transfers to the representative agent
in the EU as lump-sum transfers. All non-EU regions are assumed - consistent
with our theoretical approach - not to have committed to binding emissions
reduction targets in 2020.
As a reference case, scenario UAP reflects the efficient emission trading
scheme, thereby abstaining from any offsetting measures to mitigate negative
competitiveness implications on covered energy-intensive and export-oriented
industries. In scenarios BTA and IET , border tax adjustments and integrated
emission trading, respectively, are introduced into the emissions trading scheme.
Under the BTA regime, both tax compensation for the EU exports from the
covered sectors and tariffs for the respective EU imports are quantity based,
while the sector-specific level of BTA is determined by the EU average carbon
content in the production of the corresponding energy-intensive goods. Under
the IET regime, the EU exporters and the EU importers face the allowance price
which is applied to the actual carbon content of the respective energy-intensive
industry (see previous section for more details).
3.3 Results
In this section, we report effects of alternative policy options on the market for
emissions permits (Figure 2) and the associated output effects for the EU and
non-EU regions (Table 2), before addressing the issues of international carbon
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leakage (Table 3 and 4). The effects are measured with respect to business-as-
usual (BAU) situation in which no policy measures are taken5.
 
Figure 2 depicts the impacts on the market for emissions permits in 2020
across our scenarios. Due to the exogenous constraint to reduce carbon emis-
sions by 20% vs. BAU in the EU-27, the allowance price amounts to roughly
$ 37 US per ton CO2 in the reference scenario (UAP ). Cost-effective imple-
mentation of the target suggests that emission reduction is undertaken where
it is cheapest. In our simulation, old and new EU Member States reduce 19
and 23% versus BAU levels, respectively. Obviously, multi-sectoral modelling
approach allows to account for potentially important general equilibrium inter-
actions: The introduction of the BTA scheme (yielding scenario BTA) and the
IET scheme (yielding scenario IET ) in selected commodity markets surpass the
carbon market. In our numerical setup, the impacts are quite modest: Under
BTA, allowance price increases by roughly three per cent compared to the ref-
erence case. The introduction of the IET scheme causes the allowance price to
increase by less than one per cent compared to the UAP scenario.
These results are mainly driven by increased production and emission lev-
els resulting in a higher demand for emission allowances in covered energy-
intensive sectors (EII). The introduction of the BTA and IET regimes in
5In our theoretical framework, we refer to the BAU situation as a laissez-faire case.
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selected commodity markets partially shifts emission abatement from covered
energy-intensive industries (EII) with relatively low abatement costs to non-
energy-intensive sectors (NEI) with relatively high abatement costs. Thus,
countries with the BTA and IET regimes in energy-intensive sectors end up
with higher marginal abatement costs compared to the unilateral abatement
policy without any complementary measures.
The macroeconomic implications - measured as changes in production level
- for both EU and non-EU regions are summarised in Table 2. Referring to
the central topic of our theoretical framework, we find that European energy-
intensive sectors covered by offsetting measures (EII) are best off under the
BTA regime: For these industries, the decrease in the production level in the
BTA scenario is much less pronounced due to lower export price than un-
der alternative scenarios. Vice versa, the EII sectors in non-EU regions are
worst off under the BTA scenario as this (quantity-based) regime does not
allow the respective industries to adjust energy intensity in the production pro-
cess and makes imports to the EU more expensive. These quantitative results
confirm the assertions from the theoretical analysis as EII sectors in the EU
appear to be least exposed to international competition and therefore better
protected under the BTA regime (see proposition 4). However, from a gen-
eral equilibrium perspective, the introduction of the BTA and IET scheme in
selected energy-intensive sectors leads to production level adjustments in the
non-covered sectors. In Table 3 we report production level implications for (i)
(important) energy-producing and remaining energy-intensive sectors (REI),
(ii) non-energy-intensive sectors (NEI) and (iii) regional economies. In the EU-
27, REI sectors are able to slightly extend production level due to lower energy
prices, while non-energy-intensive sectors (NEI) decrease output to comply
with the total emission reduction target. The increase in production level in
energy-intensive sectors is, however, does not outweigh the output decrease in
the non-energy intensive sectors which results in overall output losses for the
EU-27. Remarkably, these losses are particularly pronounced under the BTA
regime. While confirming theoretical results for the covered energy-intensive
sectors, the multi-sectoral analysis thus reverses the insight of the theoretical
analysis if the aggregate production level of regional economies is taken into
consideration.
As we have seen, unilateral carbon abatement policies in the EU-27 induce
adjustments of production (and consumption) patterns towards less carbon in-
tensity and associated energy use. Neglecting economic benefits from improved
environmental quality, such adjustments decrease real income and macroeco-
nomic consumption, thereby generating welfare losses. Our simulation results
for the EU-27 indicate, however, that efficient implementation of the given
emission reduction target in the reference case (UAP ) is consistent with fairly
small welfare losses - expressed by the Hicksian Equivalent Variation (HEV) -
as compared to an unconstrained business-as-usual situation. Introduction of
the BTA and IET regimes has a negligible impact (-0.04%) on social welfare in
the EU-276.
6We report the welfare implications for EU-27 only, since a direct comparison of the welfare
impacts for other regions or globally would be misleading. This is due to the fact that environmental
effectiveness of alternative policy options for these regions differs across three scenarios (see Table 3
and 4). It should be emphasised that environmental quality does not enter into the utility function.
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Table 4: Carbon emission reduction (% vis--vis BAU)
UAP BTA IET
WORLD -1.83 -1.95 -1.95
We finally turn to the impacts on environmental effectiveness that consti-
tutes - from the perspective of the European Union - the central trade-off with
pure competitiveness considerations: Under UAP , unilateral abatement policy
leads to an increase in emissions in non-abating regions, reducing the global
environmental effectiveness (see Table 3). Although both BTA and IET oc-
cur to be a suitable strategy to reduce the leakage rate, Table 3 illustrates -
in accordance with expectations from our theoretical framework - the central
reasoning behind the superiority of the IET scheme as compared to the BTA
regime in terms of environmental effectiveness. The central insight from our
numerical analysis is that the IET scheme induces a considerably lower emis-
sions level in EII sectors outside Europe than the BTA scheme in all model
regions (except of OOE), while increase in energy efficiency represents the main
driver behind this result. Finally, the general equilibrium perspective provides
further insights into the global environmental effectiveness of alternative offset-
ting measures: Under the BTA and IET regimes, the reduction of the global
carbon emission level is feasible compared to the unilateral case. However, from
the global perspective, the IET regime does not induce a lower emission level
compared to the BTA regime (Table 4).
4 Discussion and conclusion
In 2007, the European Council developed an ambitious plan for the post-Kyoto
era, envisioning a unilateral reduction in CO2 emissions in Europe by 20%
(compared to 1990 levels) by 2020. Evidently, such a unilateral environmental
policy causes concerns about its effects on competitiveness, particularly for the
European energy-intensive industries. Moreover, the relocation of industries to
regions outside Europe threatens to reduce the effectiveness of the measures
(leakage). This paper assesses two policies that have been proposed to miti-
gate these problems: Border tax adjustments (BTA) and integrated emission
trading (IET). Our contribution is to characterise both policies, to analyse the
channels affecting their economic and environmental effectiveness and to quan-
tify the outcome. Referring to the central theme of our theoretical analysis,
we find that energy-intensive sectors in the EU are best off under the BTA
regime, while the IET scheme induces a considerably lower leakage rate than
the BTA scheme. The numerical analysis puts this view into perspective: While
the theoretical conclusions hold true for sectors participating in either BTA or
IET (i.e. energy-intensive sectors), the presence of non-participating (i.e. non-
energy-intensive) sectors can lead to a reversion of the result on competitiveness.
The carbon rebate for exports granted under both BTA and IET means that a
part of the abatement burden is shifted from the ETS sectors to the non-ETS
sectors increasing the overall costs of abatement. Finally, the numerical anal-
ysis confirms the global environmental effectiveness of both policies, with little
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difference in the impacts of BTA and IET.
These results show the importance of a careful implementation of both poli-
cies. In the sequel we briefly discuss the related legal and practical problems.
By imposing a duty on imports both BTA and IET interfere with free trade
policies. It is a legal matter whether and to what extent the policies are com-
patible with the GATT treaty on international free trade7. In their analysis of
BTA, Ismer and Neuhoff (2004) conclude that BTA do not violate the treaty if
they are based on the ”best-available technology” assumption, i.e. the assumed
carbon content of imported goods must correspond to goods produced with the
least carbon intensive technology. The macroeconomic models applied in this
paper do not, of course, allow for a precise descripture of the full spectrum of
available technologies. By fixing the carbon content of imported goods to the
energy efficient European production level we are, however, broadly in line with
the ’best-available technology’ assumption.
As for the practical implementation, the ultimate choice of an appropri-
ate offsetting measure should be based on two considerations, concerning the
institutional arrangements and the degree of international cooperation. The im-
plementation of both instruments is likely to go along with considerable admin-
istrative efforts in the domestic or foreign country, respectively. Additional to
the domestic environmental administration (national carbon registers) authori-
ties must be established to define benchmarks, to measure and to report carbon
content of the imported goods. While the BTA regime calls for a home-based
authority defining carbon standards, IET requires international cooperation to
run comparable institutions (branch offices) abroad. Thus, IET represents, in
principle, an intermediate step in multilateral cooperation on climate change
issues. The introduction of the IET regime could finally result in launching
emission reduction schemes with binding constraints abroad, which could then
be linked with the domestic scheme8. In that case, IET would be an exam-
ple of the export of EU regulation - a phenomenon that has recently attracted
attention (compare the article ”Brussels rules OK - How the European Union
is becoming the world’s chief regulator” in The Economist of September 27,
2008). Instead, BTA is per-se a non-cooperative policy option. Its introduction
may cause retaliatory measures by trading partners resulting in the welfare-
decreasing trade wars. The study of such a scenario requires a game-theoretic
setup.
Assuming the practical and legal issues being settled, our numerical analy-
sis shows that a straightforward implementation of BTA and IET can run into
difficulties. In order to avoid the distortion of competitiveness by BTA policy
makers may consider adopting a different paradigm of emission reduction. In-
stead of fixing a cap for domestic production they may prefer to cap emissions
related to domestic consumption. Analysing the implications of such a change
of paradigm, however, is left to future research.
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Appendix
The appendix presents the proofs of Propositions 1 through 4 and Corollary 5.
All proves build on transformations of the first order conditions of the firms and
the emission cap. We start by presenting the transformed first order conditions
which give rise to equations determining prices.
P-UAP We eliminate the emission tax τ with the help of the first order
condition for µd, equation 7, and thus obtain the following set of price equations:
pdd = c
d(µd)− cd1(µd)µd pdf = cd(µd)− cd1(µd)µd
pfd = c
f (µf ) pff = c
f (µf )
P-BTA As before, eliminating τ and κ by equations 15 and 12 yields a set
of price equations:
pdd = c
d(µd)− cd1(µd)µd pdf = cd(µd)
pfd = c
f (µf )− cd1(µd)µd pff = cf (µf )
P-IET In the case of IET, we use the definition of Cobb-Douglas demand
functions of private households as well as the first order conditions for µd and
µf , equation 22 and 25, to obtain
pdd =
cd(µd)
cd(µd) + γdcd1(µd)µd
[cd(µd)− cd1(µd)µd] pdf = cd(µd)
pfd =
cf (µf )
cf (µf ) + γfcf1 (µf )µf
[cf (µf )− cf1 (µf )µf ] pff = cf (µf )
with γd = αfwfαdwd and γ
f = (1−αf )wf(1−αd)wd .
From assumption 1 we infer that the emission caps, i.e. constraints , and ,
are binding. Thus they give rise to one more equation respectively. Both the
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transformed first order conditions above and Cobb-Douglas demand functions
enter into their transformation. They take the form of fix-point equations.
(µd)UAP =
E¯
αdwd + αfwf
[cd(µd)− cd1(µd)µd] (27)
(µd)BTA =
E¯
αdwd + αfwf
(
1− cd1(µd)µd
cd(µd)
) [cd(µd)− cd1(µd)µd] (28)
(µd)IET =
E¯
αdwd + αfwf
[cd(µd)− cd1(µd)µd] (29)
We are now prepared for the proofs.
Proposition 1 (Existence of Equilibria)
The existence of equilibria is guaranteed by general equilibrium theory (cf.
MasCollel et al. 1995, ch. 10). Uniqueness of equilibria follows from the unique
determination of µd and µf by equations 2 and 4 for the Laissez-Faire case,
27 and 10 for the UAP case, 28 and 18 for the BTA case, 29 and 25 for the
IET case. For equations 2, 4, 10, 18 and 25 this is a direct consequence of
the properties of the marginal cost function c(.). For equations 27, 28 and 29
this follows from the fact that the right-hand side of the equations is falling,
starting from infinity as µd goes to zero, leading to a unique crossing point with
the left-hand side.
Proposition 2 (Laissez-Faire vs. Policies)
The claim that domestic energy intensity under Laissez-Faire, (µd)LF , is higher
than domestic energy intensities µd under the three policies can easily be seen
from the following argument: The LF equilibrium is identical to the policy
equilibria if we set the emission cap E¯ to the value of domestic emissions (Ed)LF
under LF. However, due to assumption 1 we know that the E¯ is smaller than
that. Comparing the policy µds with (µd)LF is thus equivalent to comparing
µds in equations 27, 28 and 29 with E¯ shifted upwards. Clearly, such a change
increases the RHS of the equations and thus the equilibrium value of µd. The
same argument applies to the comparison of µf under LF and IET, whereas a
comparison of the first order conditions for µf under LF, equation 4, and under
UAP and BTA, equations 10 and 18, shows the identity of the foreign energy
intensities µf .
The comparison of equilibrium prices under LF and the three policies ensues
from a comparison of the first order conditions, using the inqualities for µd and
µf we just derived. We concentrate on the case of pdd, the arguments are similar
for the other prices. Due to our assumptions on the cost function cd(µ), we
know first that −cd1(µd)µd > 0 and we calculate second that
∂(cd(µd)− cd1(µd)µd)
∂µd
= −cd2(µd) < 0.
Due to the first inequality we may conclude that pdd would be higher under
LF than under any policy if all formulae (of the first order conditions 2, 5, 13
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and 20) were evaluated at (µd)LF . The second inequality shows that the claim
holds a forteriori true at an evaluation at the true values of pdd under UAP, BTA
and IET.
Using the definition of the demand functions 4, the comparison of equilib-
rium quantities qrfrd follows directly from the comparison of prices.
Proposition 3 (Energy Intensities)
Energy intensities µd under UAP, BTA and IET can be compared by virtue
of equations 27, 28 and 29. The equality of (µd)UAP and (µd)IET is obvious.
The inequality (µd)BTA < (µd)UAP = (µd)IET follows from the fact that the
denominator of the RHS of equation 28 is larger than that of 27 and 29.
To understand why (µf )IET is smaller than (µf )BTA we have to derive
equations characterizing (µ)f . In case of BTA this is simply 18. In case of IET,
we use 25, P-IET and 4 to obtain
cf1 (µ
f ) = −τ c
f (µf )
cf (µf ) + γd(cf (µf ) + τµf )
.
As τ is implicitly determined by 29 as a positive number, and given our
assumption on cf , we may infer that cf1 (µ
f ) < 0 which yields the claim. The
equality of (µf )UAP and (µf )BTA is a trivial consequence of the first order
conditions 10 and 18.
Proposition 4 (Competitiveness)
The proof of Proposition 4 resembles the one of Proposition 2. Essentially, we
use equations P-UAP, P-BTA, P-IET, the emission constraints 4, 4 and 4 and
the results on energy intensities µd and µf from Proposition 3 to compare prices,
and the comparison of prices to compare quantities. We will concentrate on the
case of pdd as before, and then explain the need of the symmetry assumption 3
in the comparison of the BTA and IET policy.
The functional form of the equation for pdd under P-UAP and P-BTA is
identical. The inequality (pdd)
UAP < (pdd)
BTA is a direct consequence of the
one we have proved above, (µd)UAP > (µd)BTA, and the fact that the RHS of
P-UAP(pdd) and P-BTA(p
d
d) is a decreasing function of µ
d (compare the proof
of Proposition 2). The inequality (pdd)
UAP < (pdd)
IET is due to the factor
cd(µd)
cd(µd)+γdcd1(µ
d)µd
> 1 in front of cd(µd) − cd1(µd)µd (which is identical to the
RHS of P-UAP(pdd)) and the equality (µ
d)UAP = (µd)BTA shown before.
The comparison of (pdd)
BTA and (pdd)
IET is trickier. First, we have to show
that (pdf )
BTA > (pdf )
IET . This follows from (µd)BTA < (µd)IET and the fact
that the c(.) is a decreasing function (cf. P-BTA and P-IET). From the com-
parison of the pdf and the definition of the demand functions 4, we conclude
that (qfd )
BTA < (qfd )
IET . Now, given that the emission cap E¯ is the same un-
der both BTA and IET and that (µd)BTA < (µd)IET , we may conclude that
domestic production is higher under BTA than under IET. So in particular
(qdd)
BTA > (qdd)
IET , and thus (pdd)
BTA < (pdd)
IET .
A glance at P-BTA(pfd) and P-IET(p
f
d) shows the difficulty of a comparison
of (pfd)
BTA and (pfd)
IET - the two formulae contain different cost functions
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cf (.) and cd(.). Without further assumptions, we cannot expect to obtain an
answer to the question how the two prices compare. Assumption 3 is sufficient
to establish the relations stated in Proposition 4, as is immediate for the case of
pfd from a comparison of P-BTA(p
f
d) and P-IET(p
f
d) and (µ
f )BTA > (µf )IET .
It is obvious from the formulae that a weaker assumption than 3 could lead to
the same result.
Corollary 5 (Leakage)
The results on the relation of foreign emissions under the three policies are a
direct consequence of the relation of quantities, derived in Proposition 4, and
of energy intensities, derived in Proposition 3.
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